Home Page About Page Photo Page What's New Page Contact Page Favorite Links Slide Show Catalog Page USS Nautilus SS-168 1st patrol Custom2 Page Custom3 Page Custom4 Page Guest Book Page Photo2 Page Photo3 Page Photo4 Page Photo5 Page Photo6 Page

Nautilus (SS-168) and its sister Narwhal (SS-167) were the US versions of the "U-Cruisers" in vogue during the late 20s and early 30s. Designed for long-range ocean cruising, these boats were as long as a Fletcher class destroyer, and displaced more. The fuel load alone was 732 tons, and the main gun armament consisted of two 6"/53-caliber weapons in single mounts fore and aft of the conning tower. Nautilus and Narwhal are easily identifiable by the raised midship gundeck surrounding the conning tower. Four single torpedo tubes were fitted beneath this deck in 1942. Click here for the Warship archival USS Nautilus archival photos.

Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS - Report of first War Patrol

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. NARRATIVE

(a) 0900 May 24, 1942 underway from Submarine Base. U.S.S.

WASMUTH escorted this vessel until dark. Made trim dive.

(b) May 25 to May 27 made daily dives enroute to patrol area

northwest of Midway.

(c) 0715 Y May 28 sighted what appeared to be a Navy PBY dead

astern, make recognition signals but plane continued heading

for us, dived and continued submerged the remainder of day.

1000 Entered patrol area.

(d) From May 24 until June 3 made routine dives. Sighted PBY's

each day. On June 3 checked depth charge bill and assured

ourselves that each man knew what was expected of him.

(e) 0420 Y June 4 submerged on course 040d T.

0544 Y Intercepted message that many planes were headed for Midway

from a point 320d T from Midway distance about 150 miles. This was

on the northern boundary of NAUTILUS area and we were close to this

point. Swept horizon continuously.

0658 Y sighted a formation of six planes resembling Army Flying

Fortresses dead ahead.

0710 Y Sighted bombing on bearing 331 d T. NAUTILUS position Lat.

30-00 N. Long. 179-25 W. Changed course to 340d T and went to battle

stations submerged.

0755 Y Saw masts over horizon. While making this observation we were

strafed by aircraft. Changed depth to 100 feet. Echo ranging first

heard at this time.

0800 Y Sighted a formation of four ships. One battleship of ISE

class and one cruiser drew toward the starboard bow, two other

cruisers toward the port bow. Decided to attack the battleship and

changed course to draw ahead. Sighted and bombed by plane. A

cruiser of the JINTSU class approached to attack with depth charges.

At least two ships were echo ranging on the NAUTILUS.

0810 Y JINTSU class cruiser dropped pattern of 5 depth charges

followed seven minutes later by a pattern of 6 depth charges.

0819 Y Went to 90 feet to avoid scouting planes. Nine depth charges

dropped at distance of about 1000 yards. When attack ceased, planed

up to periscope depth to observe.

0824 Y The picture presented on raising the periscope was one never

experienced in peacetime practices. Ships were on all sides moving

across the field at high speed and circling away to avoid the

submarine's position. Ranges were above 3000 yards. The JINTSU

class cruiser had passed over and was now astern. The battleship was

on our port bow and firing her whole starboard broadside battery at

the periscope. Flag hoists were being made; searchlights were

trained at the periscope. The exact position of the NAUATILUS may

have been known by the enemy at this time because #9 deck torpedo was

running hot in the tube as a result of the shearing of the torpedo

retaining pin during the depth charging. Periscope estimate was made

on the battleship and put on the Torpedo Data Computer. Range

estimated as 4500 yards, angle on the bow 80d starboard, speed 25

knots.

0825 Y Fired #1 tube at battleship followed by #2 tube with a 1d

right offset. After firing #2 it was found that #1 had not fired.

Battleship changed course to the left and headed directly away.

Range to battleship had now increased to 5000 yards and track was

180d. Held further fire. During this time echo ranging by surface

ships was continuous and accurate. Immediately after our firing at

the battleship, the JINTSU type cruiser headed for NAUTILUS.

0830 Y Went to 150 feet. Depth charge attack began.

0846 Y Ordered periscope depth. Battleship and other accompanying

ships, except JINTSU type cruiser, were well out of range. Echo

ranging by cruiser was still accurate.

0900 Y Raised periscope and sighted aircraft carrier bearing 013d

relative. Carrier was distant 16,000 yards and was changing course

continuously. She did not appear to be damaged, but was overhung by

anti-aircraft bursts. NAUTILUS was on a converging course. While

making this observation the JINTSU type cruiser began to close again

at high speed.

0910 Y When cruiser reached 2500 yards fired #2 torpedo tube.

Cruiser was observed to change course.

0918 Y A cruiser attacked with 6 depth charges. These were more

accurately placed then previous charges. Went to 200 feet, used

evasive tactics at slow speed, but continued advance to close the

carrier. Cruiser continued echo ranging and at 0933 two of her depth

charges landed close.

0955 Y Echo ranging ceased. Ordered periscope depth to estimate the

situation. On looking found that the entire formation first seen,

including the attacking cruisers had departed. The carrier

previously seen was no longer in sight.

1029 Y Saw 3 masts on the horizon bearing 005d T., distance 10 miles.

Changed course to 005d T. Raised the vertical antenna and

intercepted a radio message stating that a CV was damaged. Large

clouds of gray smoke were seen at four places over the horizon. The

nearest cloud of smoke had not previously been sighted, so continued

to close it at the best speed that the condition of the battery and

probable future operations for the day would allow.

1047 Y Sighted three planes approaching. Lowered periscope and

vertical antenna and continued approach at periscope depth.

1145 Y Identified the source of smoke as a burning carrier. The

carrier was still about 8 miles away and was in latitude 30d-13' N.,

Longitude 179d-17' W. Decided to overtake if possible and to attack.

1224 Y range not having decreased appreciably, changed speed to two-

thirds ahead on both motors after estimating that sufficient battery

capacity just remained for operations until night fall.

1253 Y Range decreased. Sighted two cruisers escorting the carrier.

Tentatively identified CV as a carrier of the SORYU class. The

carrier was on even keel and the hull appeared to be undamaged.

There were no flames and the fire seemed to be under control.

Accompanying cruisers were about two miles ahead of the carrier.

1300 Y The CV, which had been making 2-3 knots when the approach

began, was now stopped. At closer range it was seen that efforts

were being made by boats under her bow to pass a towing hawser and

many men were seen working on the forecastle. The decision had to be

made in which order to attack the targets presented. Attack on the

cruisers and later on the carrier was considered, but the remaining

capacity of the battery would not allow a further chase of several

miles to catch the moving cruisers, even if it were possible to

overtake them. The decision was therefore made to complete the

destruction of the CV before she could be repaired or taken in tow.

Approach continued at periscope depth. An approach course was chosen

to five torpedo hits on the starboard or island side of the carrier.

During the nest hour a repeated check was made of the silhouettes of

American and Japanese carriers in order to be certain of the identify

of the target. The target was a carrier of the SORYU class.

1359 Y Fired three torpedoes at the carrier from periscope depth.

Attempts to fire the 4th torpedo were unsuccessful. Immediately

prior to firing each torpedo, the Torpedo Data Computer generated

bearing was checked by a periscope bearing. Mean run of torpedoes

was 2700 yards. The wakes of the torpedoes were observed through the

periscope until the torpedoes struck the target. Red flames appeared

along the length of the ship from the bow to amidships. The fire

which had first attracted us to the attack ad been underneath the

demolished after flight deck and was nearly extinguished by the time

the NAUTILUS reached the firing point. This fire again broke out.

Boats drew away from the bow and many men were seen going over the

side. All 5 officers in the conning tower observed the results of

the torpedoing.

1405 Y fired last of three torpedoes at the carrier. Cruisers began

reversing course at high speed and started to echo range.

1410 Y Cruiser passed directly over the top of NAUTILUS. Changed

course to 190d T and went to 300 feet. A prolonged depth charge

attack now began.

1610 Y Came to periscope depth. Saw carrier, but the escorting

cruisers were no longer in sight. They had abandoned the carrier and

she was afire along the entire length.

1800 Y Heavy black smoke enveloped the carrier and formed a cloud

over the ship to a height of a thousand feet. The officer making

this observation compared the cloud to the oil smoke which rose from

the U.S.S. ARIZONA when that ship burned at Pearl Harbor, T.H.,

December 7-9. Nothing could be seen of the carriers hull.

1840Y Heard heavy subsurface explosions and went to depth charge

stations. A search by periscope failed to reveal any object in the

vicinity except the still greater cloud of black smoke from burning

oil. If the carrier was not found by patrol panes which searched the

vicinity to following morning, the Commanding Officer believes that

she was destroyed at this time by fire and internal explosions. We

did not however actually see her sink.

1941 Y surfaced with exhausted battery and returned to NAUTILUS

patrol area. Five torpedoes expended, forty-two depth charges

received. On surfacing no smoke or flame of any sort was seen.

(f) 0414 Y June 5 submerged.

0720 Y surfaced in accordance with orders and proceeded at fast speed

for Midway.

0906 Y, 1133 Y and 1520 Y driven down by enemy plane.

1745 Y arrived on station.

(g) June 6, uneventful.

(h) June 7 received orders to proceed Midway for fuel and

provisions.

1930 Y arrived Midway, fueled, moved four torpedoes from

after room to forward room and number 9 and 10 torpedoes to

after room.

(i) June 8 alongside dock.

(j) 1800 Y June 9, departed Midway for patrol area. Made trim

dive.

(k) June 10 changed to minus 12 time. Decided to zig only

during period of sunset and sunrise in order to make better

speed. We were averaging only a little better than eight

knots.

(l) June 10 Yoke time to June 19 King time made one trim dive

daily. Speed held down by current against us.

(m) June 20.

1530 Sound reported screws bearing 032 relative. Nothing

in sight but thinking this might be submarine dived lat. 54-32.5

long. 141-49.5 E. Screws died out after the were heard to pass

down our starboard side.

1600 Heard pinging.

1645 Sighted two ships from direction of pinging,

resembling the raider Narvik. Started approach. Ships at first

were heading in our direction but when had decreased to 4700

yards the reversed course and headed away.

1930 Surfaced.

(n) June 21.

0346 Submerged latitude 34-43, longitude 140-55E.

1934 Surfaced.

2021 Sighted flashing believed to be Katsoora Wan Light.

(o) June 22.

0345 Submerged latitude 24-48N., Latitude 140-23E.

Periscope patrol.

0940 Heard echo ranging for about one hour. Could see

nothing but visibility was bad.

1120 Sound reported screws bearing 170 relative. Nothing

in sight.

1125 Sighted destroyer through mist and fog on starboard

quarter distant about 1020 yards. Started approach but depth

control was momentarily lost and accurate set up on T.D.C. was

not obtained until 1133 at which time one torpedo was fired. By

the time torpedo had reached target track, target could not be

seen due to visibility. Sound tracked torpedo to target and

torpedo room reported hit. Seven minutes after torpedo was

fired a loud explosion was heard and felt throughout ship. The

conning officer at that time had periscope trained on last

bearing of target visibility about 300 yards and nothing was in

sight. From that time until 1210 screws were heard

intermittently and the suddenly stopped and never heard again.

The intensity of the explosion which was heard was the same as

that of a depth charge 500 yards abeam. Except for a high noise

level reported by sound and cracking in the receiver nothing

more was heard from this destroyer. In the opinion of the

commanding officer a hit was made on this destroyer had she sank

at 1210.

1722 Sighted vessel with clipper bow probably 1500 tons;

tried to close for attack but could not get closer than 3500

yards.

1935 Surfaced.

(p) June 23.

0345 Submerged latitude 34-37, longitude 140-63E.

0841 Sighted 2 engine high wing monoplane. Went to 100

feet for about one hour then continued periscope patrol.

Noticed oil slick today. Decided to run south during night and

renew number three main engine exhaust valve gasket and

determine cause of oil slick.

1935 Surfaced.

(q) June 24.

0345 Submerged latitude 34-19.5, longitude 140-20E.

1900 Surfaced. Removed exhaust valve gasket and discovered

fuel oil must have come up through compensating line. Headed

back to line which was supposed to be route between Marshalls

and Segami Kada.

(r) June 25.

0330 Sighted a large vessel on our port quarter, angle on

the bow about 50 degrees starboard. Unfortunately we were

silhouetted against the dawn so dived to make approach. We had

apparently been seen because a destroyer now moved from the port

side of this vessel and when about 1000 yards on our starboard

quarter started a depth charge attack.

0345 Fired two torpedoes at this large ship and went deep

because depth charges were getting closer. Sound tracked

torpedo to target the reported rumbling sound and crackling

noise and screws stopped.

0439Three load explosion were heard which shook the boat

more than depth charges and were longer in duration.

0512 At periscope depth, nothing in sight.

0522 Sighted destroyer, range about 12,000 yards, started

approach. For the nest hour we probably closed a little.

0710 While destroyer was on course 200 T. He went ahead

about 18 knots and was soon out of sight.

0831 Sound heard pinging from 196 relative.

0835 Sighted destroyer and commenced approach. This was

not the same destroyer sighted at 0522.

0854 Fired first of 2 torpedoes. First torpedo was seen to

be a bull's eye and flame issued from number two stack and

amidships portion raised a few feet, but no other damage was

immediately apparent. Fifteen seconds later the second torpedo

hit forward and the damage was terrific. She immediately

started sinking by the bow heeled over to starboard. By 0858

the destroyer was seen to be sinking fast.

0905 Heard several explosions and destroyer sunk.

1930 Surfaced.

2018 Ran through a huge oil slick one mile across and

several miles wide. This was thought to be oil from the tanker

which was attacked at 0345.

(s) June 26.

0339 Submerged latitude 34-32N., longitude 139-55E.

0450 Sighted a destroyer heading up the coast; started

approach but could not close. Decided to remain in this

position in as much as he may come back. Nothing more seen of

destroyer.

(t) June 27.

0346 Submerged latitude 34-38, longitude 140-08E., further

east than we had intended but weather conditions made navigation

difficult.

0520 Fugi Yama in clear sight as well as the coast of

Honshu, O'Shima and Miyaki Shima. Sea glassy calm.

1930 Surfaced.

2224 Sighted a Sampan about 1500-2000 tons headed in our

direction. He was seen to change course once.

2226 Submerged to make periscope approach because

visibility was at least 10,000 yards all around.

2244 Fired one stern tube.

2245 Saw flames aft and heard explosion of torpedo about

same time. Sampan was seen to sink by stern.

2316 Surfaced, nothing in sight.

(u) June 28.

0340 Submerged latitude 34-40, longitude 139-56.

0355 Sound reported hearing screws bearing 070 relative.

0403 Sighted large Sampan range 6000 yards. Started

approach but unable to close.

1604 Sighted two ships plus three stack cruiser. Started

approach on largest and closest one which resembled the SIMAKURA

MARU. 17,500 tons.

1621 Fired three torpedoes and found that the cruiser had

apparently sighted air bubbles and was headed in our direction.

Ordered deep submergence.

1629 Depth charge attack which was the worst ever

experienced by this vessel. Damage is listed in paragraph

eight.

1745 Echo ranging ceased and started coming up slowly to

periscope depth.

1815 Sound reported hearing crackling in receiver although

not so loud as when destroyer was sunk.

1829 Periscope observation, nothing in sight.

1919 Just before surfacing heard and felt a heavy explosion

though from a great distance.

1935 Surfaced. Sighted several small Sampans during night.

(v) June 29.

0343 Submerged in vicinity of Miyaki Shima, decided this

would be a more quiet area where damage caused by depth charging

could be appraised.

0750 Sighted masts and stack of a small freighter probably

2500 tons. Started approach but could not close.

1930 Surfaced.

(w) June 30.

0350 Submerged in vicinity of Miyaki Shima and found it

impossible to run at periscope depth due to heavy swells. 100

feet was the shallowest depth that could be maintained. It is

the opinion of the commanding officer that this ship should not

be subjected to any more depth charge attacks due to damage.

1930 surfaced in heavy swells.

(x) July 1.

0346 Submerged south of Inubo Saki. Heavy swells did not

permit periscope patrol.

1930 Surfaced and made decision to return to Pearl due to

material condition of this ship. Set course 093 T.

(y) July 2.

0848 Picked up radar contact distant 8 miles and followed

it in to six miles, then dived. Position at time latitude 35-

10N., Longitude 145-12E.

(z) July 3 King time to July 7 Mike time.

Uneventful. Made one trim dive.

(aa) July 7 Yoke time.

0543 Y Sighted Navy PBY bearing 030 T. Distant 12 miles

heading west. Nautilus position latitude 29-05 N., longitude

179-37.

1408 Y Radar contact distant 11 miles moved in until plane

was sighted and identification signals exchanged at 1420 Y.

From this time until 1507 Y many radar contacts were made. At

1507 Y the last contact was at eight miles. It was noticed that

planes were at that time taking off from Midway. The eight

miles by radar contact checked with Navigation position.

(bb) July 8.

Uneventful.

(cc) July 9.

1130 Xray Sighted Navy PBY distance 4 miles headed east.

1131 Xray Radar contact 3 miles. Exchanged recognition

signals. Our position latitude 23-49.5, longitude 167-56N.

(dd) July 10.

1518 Latitude 22-49, longitude 162-16W, sighted Navy PBY

distant eight miles on starboard quarter heading east.

1520 Radar contact on plane distance five miles. Plane

continued on course until well ahead then apparently sighted us

and turned back. Established identity about 1530 and plane

again headed east, fading from radar at 4 miles.

(ee) July 11.

0544 Contacted ALLEN our escort and proceeded to Pearl

Harbor.

0720 Started having radar contacts on friendly planes.

0800 Radar contact at 35 miles undoubtedly Oahu.

1130 Arrived Pearl Harbor.

2. WEATHER

The weather enroute station, on station and the return trip

followed the Pilot Chart and Asiatic Pilot closely, in particular the

rain and overcast sky. The temperature was at all times quite

comfortable. The regular issue submarine coats and rain-clothes were

adequate.

Enroute and off Midway, with exception of two rain squalls and a

partially overcast sky, the weather was excellent. The sea was flat

to moderate with a moderate swell.

Enroute Midway to station the sky was overcast a considerable

amount of time and the sea flat to moderate with a moderate swell.

This swell started from the west; then, with the wind, hauled

gradually aft to astern. Then it changed direction further up the

port side until, by longitude. 160E, the wind and sea were from the

south-south-west and so remained. The sky was from seventy0five

percent to totally overcast from this longitude to Japanese coast.

At one time no navigation sights could be taken for thirty-six hours

and poor sights for considerably longer.

While on station the wind and sea were mostly from the south and

the visibility moderate to poor with an overcast sky. Light rain was

experienced quite regularly, which while not comfortable to the

person reduced further the already rather poor visibility. On June

30 and July 1, in the vicinity of Miyaki Shima, there was a strong

easterly wind accompanied by long, heavy swells from the east. These

swells were so powerful that depth control at a reasonable speed was

impossible at a depth than one hundred feet. This wind and sea were

accompanied by rain and a low barometer. This storm was possibly the

edge of a typhoon though few of the normal indications of an

approaching typhoon were noted. Those noted were for the storm

center at a great distance. Two days prior to the storm the sea was

glassy and the visibility excellent. Fujisan was in clear view at a

distance of eighty-five miles, this in sharp contrast to the normal

poor visibility in the area.

On the return passage the weather was much the same as enroute

station.

3. TIDAL INFORMATION

From Midway to longitude 145dE both enroute operating area and

return the current averaged one to one and one-half knots with a set

essentially east; which current must be taken into account in

computing the time enroute. At longitude 145dE, an abrupt change in

current was experienced. From that longitude to the coast of Japan

the current averaged on and one-half to two knots setting 045. Both

of the foregoing are according to the Pilot Chart and Asiatic Pilot

but are considered so strong as to be worth of special note.

About twenty miles south of Nojima Saki, was the only place

where the effect of tidal current was definitely experienced. Here

the ebb changed the normal 045- 1.5 knot current to a direction 080

at 2 knots. About twenty miles to the eastward of Miyaki Shima a

current due north at about one and one-half knots was experienced at

irregular times, this change in direction form north-east having no

apparent connection with the tide.

On June 30 and July 1 heavy swells and strong winds from the

east were experienced as described under _Weather_. In spite of

these strong winds and swells the normal current northeast at from

one and one-half to two knots prevailed.

It is to be noted that, according to the currents indicated on

the charts and described in the Asiatic Pilot, it is not possible for

a submerged submarine to pass through the islands to the south of

Sagami Nada to cover the western approaches without passing through

mineable waters, unless the vessel leaves the assigned area.

4. NAVIGATION AIDS

The powerful lighthouses on the south-east coast of Honshu are

extinguished or very dim, possibly also time scheduled, as none of

them were seen sufficiently to positively identify. Katsuura Wan

Light and Mojima Saki Light were perhaps seen but not definitely.

Lights, both fixed and irregularly flashing, and red as well as

white, were seen at infrequent intervals. The glow over O'Shima,

described in the Asiatic Pilot was not seen. While off Mojima Saki

when the coast was in view no difficulty was experienced in fixing

the ship's position from bearings of mountain peaks. While in the

southern part of the area it was observed that Miyaka Shima and

Micura Shima, when viewed from directions east to north-east from the

islands, were so similar in appearance that one might be mistaken for

the other except that Micura Shima has a prom9inent hump on the left

tangent.

5. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY WARSHIPS OR MERCHANT VESSELS SIGHTED

DATE TIME POSITION COURSE SPEED TYPE

June 0800 Lat. 30-00N. 250 T. 25 One cruiser of Jintsu

4 Y Long. 179-25W. and class, one BB of Ise

various class, two cruisers of

Yubari class.

June 0800 Lat. 30-05N, 250 T. Unknown One CV of Soryu class.

4 Y Long. 179-22W. And

various

June 1029 Lat. 30-13N. 50 T. 0 One CV of Soryu class,

4 Y Long. 179-18W. one cruiser of Jintsu

class, one cruiser of

Yubari class.

June 1645 Lat. 34-32.5N. 290 T. 10 Two ships resembling

20 Int. Long.141-49.5E. the raider Narvik.

June 1125 Lat. 34-48N. 221 T. 16 Large DD. Similar to

22 Int. Long. 140-22E. Shinonome.

June 1722 Lat. 34-55N. 060 T. 7 Sampan about 1500

22 Int. Long. 140-18E. tons, clipper bow,

with bow sprit. 2

stick masts, wide

funnel.

June Sighted many lights in

22 close to the beach

during the night.

June 0330 Lat. 34-34N. 310 T. 11 One tanker at least

25 Int. Long. 140-26E. 10,000 tons with large

DD as escort.

June 0522 Lat. 34-34N. 200 T. 18 One large destroyer.

25 Int. Long. 140-26E.

June 0831 Lat 34-34N 226 T. 12 One large destroyer;

25 Int. long 140-26E white band on funnel.

June 0450 Lat 34-32N 60 T. 12 One DD.

26 Int. Long 139-55E

June 2224 Lat 34-31N 342 T. 15 One 1500 ton Sampan,

27 Int. Long 139-56E two masts.

June 0403 Lat 34-40N 040 T. Unknown One 1500-2000 ton

28 Int. Long 139-56E Sampan

June 1604 Lat 34-34N 115 T. 13.5 One ship similar to

28 Int. Long 140-13E Kamakura Maru, One

ship similar to

Arimasam Maru. One

three stack cruiser

escort.

June 0750 Lat 34-14N 040 T. 12 Single stack

29 Int. freighter; 2 masts

about 2500 tons

6. DESCRIPTION OF ALL AIRCRAFT SIGHTED

DATE TIME NUMBER DESCRIPTION

June 1055 1 Unable to describe. Was strafed by

4 Y this one.

June 1047 3 Unable to describe except they were

4 Y monoplanes.

June 0906Y 1 Light bomber 97 SE LB

5 1133 1 " " " " "

Y 1 " " " " "

1520

Y

June 0841 1 Two engine high wing monoplane similar

23 INT to 97NSEFLBT

9. DETAILS OF TORPEDO ATTACKS

ATTACK

NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

NO. 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 3

TORPS

FIRED

FIRING - - 30 - 11 15 1 15

INTER.

POINT MOT MOT MOT MOT MOT MOT MOT MOT

OF AIM

TRACK 60s 130p 125s 162p 127s 120s 127p 111s

ANGLE

DEPTH 20 18 16 12 18 12 10 20

SET

EST. 28 18 18 12 18 12 10 20

DRAFT

TORP H H H H H H H H

PERF.

EST 25 16 0 16 11 12 15 13.5

SPEED

RESULTS Not Not 3 Hit Not Obs. Not Sank Sank Not

OF Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs.

ATTACK

EVIDENCE - - (a) (b) (c) Per. Per. (d)

OF Obs. Obs.

SINKING

CLASS Ise Jintsu Soryu Shinonone O Amagiri Patrol P

BB CL CV DD DD

a. (1) Violent explosions heard and clouds of black smoke and

fire seen at 1830.

(2) No fire at 1915.

b. (1) Sound heard torpedo merge with screws of target.

(2) Forward torpedo room personnel reported a rumbling sound

3 minutes after firing and made remark we must have made a

hit.

(3) One large explosion 7 minutes after firing, nothing in

sight.

(4) Screws stopped at 1210 and never re-started.

c. (1) Tanker's screws stopped followed by crackling and minor

explosions.

(2) Large oil slick was observed that evening.

(3) Escorting DD maneuvered as if picking up survivors for 30

minutes.

d. (1) Men in quiet compartment heard two explosions, the first

(large warhead) loudest.

8. ENEMY ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES.

a. June 4, 1942

Scouting planes will probably be searching an area about

ten miles ahead of a Japanese fleet formation. These planes are

apparently equipped with machine guns only and will strafe the

submarine when sighted. Of the four ships sighted at 0600 Y

three were cruisers and one a battleship. These ships were

observed eight miles ahead of the carrier sighted later on, two

on each bow. Two vessels will echo range and probably endeavor

to fix the position of the submarine. Remaining vessels of the

force will run in wide circles at high speed.

Very few of the depth charges dropped during the morning

were very close. The reason probably being that other ships in

the vicinity were interfering with echo ranging. This vessel

attempted to maintain the offensive as long as possible by

coming to periscope depth and firing torpedoes. It is believed

we succeeded in this effort. By actually seeing the ships which

are echo ranging evasion tactics are more effective.

At least once during the forenoon the commanding officer

had the unique experience of looking at the whole broadside

being fired at him.

During the afternoon depth charging the Japs were much more

accurate and many of the charges were very close. During this

time the sound as though heavy chains were being dragged across

the deck was heard. It is believed that the Japs therefore use

drag wires in an effort to locate the submarine. The commanding

officer about a year ago read a patrol report of a British

submarine officer who had a similar experience. Also ONI 49

page 322 under Listening devices underseas, states that the

Japanese undoubtedly will use the towed wire method. Also

during the afternoon the sound as though two heavy object

dropped on deck was heard. This vessel at that time was at 340

feet. It is believed quite possible that two charges hit the

hull and due to the pressure did not explode. The one thought

that came to the mind of the commanding officer was that the

Japs break off the attack too soon. With a battery that was

close to exhausted much embarrassment could have been caused us

by them continuing the attack.

Damage caused by depth charging was negligible, tow soft

patches are now weeping as a result. After starboard group vent

hydraulic supply line silver soldered connection ruptured

allowing leakage into engine room. Controller for forward

batter blowers was thrown out.

The note below might be of some value in determining if the

Japs do have a new underwater sound apparatus. Observations

were make by I. E. Wetmore, C.R.M.(AA), U.S. Navy.

"In connection with the depth charge attacks made on us

this morning and this afternoon, the following facts were noted

specifically:

1. Just before the start of the attacks, or at least before

the enemy closed on us, a peculiar crackling noise was

heard approximately on the bearing where the enemy was

seen by periscope. This occurred in each instance

before his propellers were heard and continued until

about the time the first of the charges were dropped.

2. The bearing of this sound was quite sharp (about 2 or 3

degrees) although it could be heard from quarter to

quarter astern.

3. The best description I could give of the character of

the sound was that it sounded like someone dragging a

stick rapidly and at a steady rate along a picket fence,

and there was a hollow-sounding background to the noise.

4. The possibility of the enemy having some type of

underwater-sound _RADAR_ is advanced. They seemed to

get our approximated location in the morning, and our

exact location this afternoon, very quickly - even

before closing to attack."

b. June 5, 1942.

This vessel while enroute to new patrol area was driven

down three times by a single enemy plane. Their method of approach

in each instance was the same, dive down close to the surface of the

water and attempt to get their plane below the horizon in order to

keep our of sight.

c. Depth charge attack June 25, 1942.

About twenty-one depth charges were dropped during this

attack non of which were close enough to cause us much alarm. The

merchantmen did not change course during the attack, maintaining a

steady course.

d. Depth charge attack June 28, 1942.

This attack was made by a cruiser and was the most severe

of any depth charge attack received. As we were passing two

hundred feet a pattern of five depth charges was dropped. The

fifth one was the closest of all and must not have been over

twenty five yards away. Every compartment reported it must have

been near it. The conning tower felt as though it would be torn

from the rest of the hull. Depth charges were dropped in

patterns of three or five until eleven charges were dropped in

all. The following damage was noticed as a result of this

attack:

(1) the rudder which had apparently been worked loose on

depth charging on June 4, and which banged during

rolling of ship enroute to our area became very noisy

and the starboard ram moved in jerks as though a

terrific load was on that particular ram. Inspection

failed to locate the trouble.

(2) Three soft patches which had started leaking on our

first depth charging were found to be leaking much more

and the engine room and maneuvering room soft patches in

particular had a steady stream.

(3) The bow plane indicator housing in anchor windlass room

ruptured in two places when the bell crank fulcrum pin

sheared and allowed the bell crank to work free. The

enlisted man stationed in the windless room was injured

by flying pieces of aluminum casing.

(4) Electric cables were forced into hull and in several

cases streams of water entered hull. A bucket line had

to be formed in control room.

(5) Silver soldered joints in number 4 and number 10 air

bank opened up and apparently similar joints had opened

up in main ballast tanks.

(6) Silver soldered joints in hydraulic line to number 7

main ballast tank parted. This line was temporarily

blanked off. Several other lines were found to be

leaking.

(7) The trim pump sea valve was knocked loose from its

stem.

(8) Stern tubes started leaking excessively.

(9) Inspection has not been made but number one and three

outboard exhaust valves are leaking putting full sea

pressure on inboard valve.

(10) The after secondary drain sea valve loosened on its

stem.

e. The Japanese are now using destroyers and cruisers as

escorts for merchant vessels of any size and any attack on

these merchant vessels is sure to result in depth charging.

Three stack cruisers apparently are much more accurate in

their attacks than are destroyers. Merchantmen apparently

have orders to continue course and speed when escort

attacks submarines.

9. MAJOR DERANGEMENTS

a. C & R.

(1) Rudder developed knocking noise and starboard ram developed

noise and binding in its forward travel.

(2) Housing of bow plane tilting indicator gear in windlass room

was ruptured when bell crank fulcrum pin sheared and bell

crank carried away during depth charging on June 28, 1942.

(3) No. 1 periscope developed noise and heat in hoisting gears.

(4) Trim pump worked erratically. Trim line sea valve became

loose and vibrated when pumping to sea.

(5) Bow buoyancy tank developed leaks when welded seams opened

up on topside.

(6) Soft patches and rubber cables developed leaks during depth

charging.

b. Ordnance

(1) Sheer pins broke in tubes nos. 9 and 10.

(2) Gyro extracting mechanism jammed on tube No. 1 on June 4.

Fired normally on June 28.

(3) Electrical contact makers to show position of gyro spindle

failed on tubes nos. 1 and 3.

(4) Interlock shuttle bars closed ready light circuits when not

exactly lined up on tubes nos. 3 and 5.

(5) Stop bolt operating rods on tubes nos. 3 and 4 failed

repeatedly to return to battery after firing. Misalignment

is present.

(6) Firing valve relief valve failed to function which resulted

in slow closing of the firing valve on tube no. 3. Stem was

found to be slightly bent.

(7) Particles of white plastic appeared in forward tube nest

from WRT tank. It is believed some other type of

preservative should be used in WRT and WRM tanks in

submarines.

(8) Grove pressure regulators failed on tubes nos. 7, 8, 9, and

10. Working parts corroded.

(9) Gyro setter spindle on tube no. 4 out of axial alignment

about 300 thousandths. Will require yard work to correct.

c. Engineering.

(1) Main engine outside exhaust valves.

On June 4, 1942, the outside exhaust valve gasket for #4

engine carried away with resultant flooding of the engine. The

exhaust valve gasket was replaced by a spare in Midway on June

6. One June 28, a casualty occurred to #1 and #3 main engine

outside exhaust valves which gave the same indications as that

of June 4, i.e. sea pressure between outside and inside valves,

and it was presumed that the outside valve gasket had carried

away on these valves, however, this can only be verified by

inspection at a suitable time. Just prior to both these

casualties this vessel underwent a severe depth charge attack

indicating that the gaskets are not of the proper design to

withstand pressures due to depth charges. The gasket is

dovetailed 1/32_ in the groove on each side and is held in with

rubber cement. It is considered that this is not sufficient to

hold the gasket in place and a retainer ring should be installed

to positively hold the gaskets in place. The Submarine Base

will be requested to perform this work upon arrival.

(2) Main engine exhaust manifolds.

The fresh water cooling connections from the exhaust elbow

to the exhaust manifold on #2 unit, #3 engine and #1 and #2

units #4 engine, developed cracks in the manifold jacketing.

One of these cracks had been welded closed prior to departure

from Pearl Harbor. Rubber patches backed with wood blocks were

wired to the manifold and sealed with copaltite and stopped the

leaks in 2 cases but the crack in #1 unit, #4 engine opened

wider and had to be patched repeatedly. It is believed that the

water connections on the manifold are slightly out of position

and the cracks are the result of taking up too tightly on the

exhaust elbow thus throwing a strain on the connection which

cracks under vibration. A dutchman or a thicker elbows gasket

will be used to prevent a recurrence.

d. Communication

(1) Antenna trunk was found flooded after 300 foot submergence

and depth charging on June 25, 1942, and flooded on each

succeeding dive. Cause believed to be cracked entering

insulator.

(2) Direction finder shaft entering hull developed leak causing

flooding of lower loop assembly and collector rings.

10. RADIO RECEPTION.

Last consecutive serial sent No. 6.

Last consecutive serial received No. 7.

During the time this vessel was operating as part of the Midway

Task Group, between June 2 and June 8, serial numbers 2 and 3 were

apparently missed. It is believed that Comtaskfor 7 050640 of June

is one of the missing serials although it contained no key work to

identify it.

It was found impossible to copy NPM low frequency Fox Schedule,

using the Direction Finder Loop, with any degree of solidarity, while

submerged off Midway. Since the Operation Order called for guarding

the Fox Schedule, the vertical antenna was used with the attendant

disadvantage of always having about four feet of mast exposed.

This vessel has three models of Loop Coupling Units,

manufactured by Naval Research Laboratory, Bellevue, Washington; Navy

Yard, Mare Island, California; and Submarine Base,

Pearl Harbor, T.H. Two days before arriving on station at Midway the

three units were tested, and the Mare Island Coupler was chosen as

giving the best reception at the maximum depth of 54 feet, which is

inadequate inasmuch as periscope depth is 68 feet. On station the

Mare Island Coupler was used by results were practically negative.

Reception of NPM Fox Schedules throughout the rest of the Patrol

were excellent. The low frequency schedule faded at about 147d East

but it was always possible to copy high frequency schedules in the

area. Some interference was experienced from Jap stations operating

on nearby frequencies but none appeared to be deliberate.

About 1200 Zed, June 29, 1942, a Japanese station blanket the

8230 kcs. Schedule with the following message, "Conte Verde Left

Shanghai noon twenty-ninth".

No trouble was experienced in transmitting any of the messages

sent. The vertical antenna was used on all occasions with excellent

results.

The performance of the SD Radar during the patrol can be classed

as very good. No serious trouble was experienced, and some excellent

results were obtained. From the experience gained so far a lane must

be at an altitude of at least 1000 feet before a satisfactory echo

can be picked up. This ship has been unable to pick up ships or low

flying planes with the radar. All airplanes that were sighted flying

at sufficient elevation were picked up on the radar at ranges varying

from 4 to 12 miles. Two contacts were made when planes were not

sighted, one at 8 miles moving in to 6 and one at 15 miles, which was

not again seen.

11. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS.

Sound conditions in the area were fair to good. Targets were

picked up at an average range of about 4000 yards. There is a

definite temperature gradient in all parts of this area but it is

erratic, varying from about -2 to +3 degrees per hundred feet. The

usual fish noises were heard, and after the first day the sound

operators had little difficulty with distinguishing them from real

contacts.

The only indication of a density layer was experienced on June

28, 1942, when returning to periscope depth from 300 feet, normally

about 25,000 pounds of water would have to be flooded in order to

obtain a trim, on then occasion no water was flooded in and the trim

was the same at 70feet as it had been at 300 feet. A very decided

layer was noted at 140 feet to 150 feet on this occasion and it was

difficult to force the ship through from deep submergence.

12. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY.

The health of the officers and crew was excellent during the

patrol. During the first two weeks approximately twenty-five percent

caught clods but they were not serious. A summary of the ailments

treated by Chief Pharmacist's Mate during the entire patrol is as

follows:

Common colds 35 Arthritis 1 (TRAN. at Midway)

Gatarral fever 2 Cysts 1

Minor wounds 4 Burns 1

Constipation 2 Dermatitis 1

Conjunctivitis 3 Dental: Extractions 2

Temp. Fillings 1

Total number of sick days - SIX.

The greatest factor in improved habitability of the ship was the

newly installed air-conditioning equipment. The equipment is not of

sufficient capacity to effect much cooling but the reduction of

humidity kept the ship comfortable at all times, though this was not

a fair test as the area of operations was cool. The water recovered

was ample for baths, laundry and scrubbing down. As a result, no

drastic steps had to be taken to conserve fresh water. This vessel

has an "Easy" standard household washing machine with a centrifugal

drier. Its use with the water made available by the air-conditioning

equipment assisted materially in the effort to keep clothing clean.

This vessel has light leather bunk covers which have proved

their worth in keeping the mattress covers clean. Attached to each

bunk is a small leather bag designed to be used as a laundry bag. A

considerable number of our crew used this bag as a locker in which to

keep clothing being currently used and such articles as toilet

articles and books. The report from our crew is that these bags have

been invaluable.

Enroute station and during the return trip, all hands were

scheduled for lookout watches so that every man on board spent at

least one-half hour in the sun and fresh air every second day. When

submerged all day the use of the sun-lamps took the place of the sun-

light. In addition, vitamin tablets were issued as required one per

man per day after the first week of patrol.

13. Factors of Endurance Remaining.

Torpedoes - Seven in the forward room, two in forward

superstructure tubes, seven in after room.

Fuel - 48,000 gallons on hand on return.

Provisions - Approximately two months supply remains on hand.

Personnel - The remaining endurance of personnel is difficult to

estimate due to the factors affecting endurance. Depth charging,

especially if accurate, has a decided affect on personnel and it is

considered a good idea to proceed to a quiet area for a day or so

after depth charging. The sinking of a ship increases morale and

thereby increases their endurance. Under the same conditions that

were encountered during the time on station remaining endurance is

estimated to be fourteen days.

14. Remarks

Material damage caused by depth charge attacks especially the

one received on June 28 caused the ending of this patrol.

This vessel was lucky enough to get in some good attacks which

evidence shows were successful. It is believed that this factor

is the cause of the present high state of morale noticed on

board. The work of all hands has been of the highest order and

there was no "let down" noticed at any time except immediately

following depth charge attacks. The work of the navigator

Lieutenant Commander Benson the diving officer Lieutenant Hogan

and the T.D.C. operator Lieutenant Lynch is worthy of special

comment.

FB5-42/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY TWO

Serial 025 In Care of Fleet Post Office,

San Francisco, California,

July 13, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY TWO.

To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS (SS168) - Report of First War Patrol.

Reference (a) ComSubDiv 42 Conf. Serial 027 of June 12, 1942.

1. Comment covering that portion of the subject report which dealt with

the activities of the NAUTILUS during the battle of Midway is

contained in reference (a).

2. The remainder of the patrol is characterized by the same intelligent

aggressiveness evidenced at Midway, and although intensive enemy

anti-submarine measures prevented visual observation of the results

of attacks made on two occasions, it is considered that no real

opportunity to do damage to the enemy was missed.

3. The increased use by the Japanese of supersonic equipment is noted,

as well as its more effective employment by them. In this connection

their apparent ability to obtain contact at ranges for in excess of

those commonly attainable by our own equipment, as experienced by

NAUTILUS at the battle of Midway was confirmed by further experience

in the patrol area. This, as noted in reference (a) constitutes a

sharp challenge both to our technical research and to our naval

intelligence organizations. A resort to the old fashioned cutting-

out party conceivably could, prove effective in this connection under

certain conditions.

4. It is considered that the decision of the commanding officer to cut

short his patrol in the face of serious damage sustained as a result

of depth-charge attack was amply justified, and further, reflects

excellent judgment on his part.

5. The unsatisfactory performance of the loop antenna while submerged

off Midway is noted with some surprise, as previous reports

concerning similar equipment have been most favorable. The excellent

performance of the SD radar while on patrol is likewise noted.

6. While recognizing the benefits to the individuals health of getting

as much sum and fresh air as possible while on patrol, the practice

of placing men on look-out watch without regard to their

qualification for such duty should be discontinued, unless such

lookouts are additional to the regularly detailed ones and can be

cleared from the bridge without causing an increase in the diving

time.

7. The NAUTILUS during this patrol is considered to have inflicted the

following damage to the enemy:

SUNK

1 CV - SORYU class 14,000 tons.

1 AO - 10,000 tons.

1 DD - AMIGIRI class 1,700 tons.

HIT AND PROBABLY SERIOUSLY DAMAGED

1 AP - KAMAKURA MARU type 17,500 tons

POSSIBLY SUNK

1 DD - SHINONONE class 1,700 tons.

8. The Division Commander is keenly gratified to observe the high

morale and spirit of the teamwork evidenced by the officers and crew

of the NAUTILUS. This speaks in the highest terms regarding the

quality of both the commissioned and the enlisted personnel of this

vessel and is borne out by the results obtained on this patrol.

9. for his outstanding performance of duty on this first patrol

including the battle of Midway and his continual aggressiveness and

determination in his patrol area the commanding officer is

recommended for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal. He has

previously been recommended for the award of the Navy Cross for his

conduct during the action at Midway. It is further recommended that

the other officers of this vessel be given a letter of commendation

by the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the enlisted personnel

one by the Force commander for their well executed part in the

successful accomplishments of this patrol.

J.M. HAINES.

Copy to:

Comsubron FOUR

CO USS NAUTILUS

FC5-4/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

Serial 0218 July 14, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.

To : The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. NAUTILUS First War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The first war patrol of the NAUTILUS was an excellent one. The

commanding officer was most aggressive in carrying home his attacks.

The attack on the SORYU class carrier on June 4, 1942, was a perfect

example of a submarine doggedly pursuing its objective in the face of

severe enemy opposition.

2. The commanding officer, who is on the spot, must be the judge of

which is the better target to attack when several ships present

themselves. It is, however, felt that in the case of small convoys

with only one escorting ship, consideration should be given to

attacking the escorting cruiser or destroyer first. If this can be

successfully carried out the slower, unprotected merchant ships are

more or less at the mercy of the submarine.

3. The action of the commanding officer in coming to periscope depth

while, or soon after, being depth charged is noteworthy and deserves

commendation. It has great merit as an aid in conducting evasive

tactics when enemy air is not present, and it certainly gives the

commanding officer a definite picture of the situation impossible to

obtain by sound.

4. The smaller casualties encountered, such as the inability to fire

certain torpedo tubes, are believed to be incident to the vessel just

having completed an extensive overhaul and modernization, and to

depth charge attacks. The decision of the commanding officer to

return early from patrol was a sound one in view of the extent of

damage to the ship at that time.

5. Attention is invited to the fact that this is the first command of

this officer, and that it was necessary to initialte the patrol

without normal training for a new commanding officer. By copy of

this comment the Squadron Commander congratulates the commanding

officer, officers and crew on their splendid performance.

J.H. BROWN, jr.

Copy to:

NAUTILUS